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INTRODUCTION 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (-First Security"), the 
plaintiff and appellant in this action, hereby submits this Reply 
Brief pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The defendants and appellees are represented by two 
different attorneys, each of whom have filed a separate brief with 
the court. This Reply Brief responds to the issues raised in both 
of those briefs. For ease of identification, Orville and Ruby 
Creech shall be referred to hereinafter as the "Creeches", and 
Larry, Joann and Herb Creech shall be referred to as the "Creech 
children." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CREECHES' FILING OF BANKRUPTCY CONSTITUTES AN 
ACT OF DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1986 LOAN 
DOCUMENTS. 
The 1986 Loan Documents between the Creeches and First 
Security provide that the Creeches shall be in default if they 
fail to make payments when due or if they become insolvent. See 
Appellant's Statement of Facts, If 1(a). First Security has 
alleged that the Creeches* filing of bankruptcy is an act of 
default under the terms of the Loan Documents. See Brief of 
Appellants, pp. 12-16. The Creeches argue that their bankruptcy 
filing does not constitute an act of default because "ipso facto 
clauses are not enforceable." Brief of Orville and Ruby Creech, 
p. 11. 
However, once an asset is no longer part of the bankruptcy-
estate, ipso facto clauses become valid and enforceable. In In re 
Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983), the court explained that 
since the asset in question had been abandoned by the trustee, the 
creditor was entitled to declare the borrower's loan in default 
under the terms of an ipso facto clause contained in the Loan 
Documents. 
The security Documents authorized [the 
creditor] to immediately repossess the Van upon 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition (bankruptcy 
clause). While this bankruptcy clause was 
initially inoperative under 11 U.S.C. § 544 
irrespective of such clause, the § 541(c) 
prohibition against such a bankruptcy clause 
has been held inoperable once the asset has 
been abandoned from the estate. Accordingly, 
the bankruptcy clause became effective upon 
abandonment, the debtors were in default of the 
security agreement and therefore no longer 
entitled to the primary possessor interest in 
the Van. 
Id. at 1058 (citations omitted). In In re Mitchell, 85 B.R. 564 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1988), the court reached a similar result. 
"[W]hen the asset is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate, the 
[ipso factol clause becomes operative and enforceable." Id. at 
566. See also In re Whitaker, 85 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
1988), In re Sparaao, 31 B.R. 552, 554 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1983), In 
re Schweitzer, 19 B.R. 860, 866-67 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982), and In 
re Whatlev, 16 B.R. 394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not specifically ruled 
on this issue. In Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West. 882 F.2d 
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1543 (10th Cir. 1989), the court stated H[w]e do not rule on the 
enforceability of such ripso factol clauses because the issue has 
not been raised and thus is not before us[.]M Id. at 1546, fn. 5. 
While it is true that cases have been decided suggesting ipso 
facto clauses are unenforceable as a matter of law, e.g. Riqgs 
National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 984-85 
(4th Cir. 1984), and other cases cited by the Creeches, those 
cases are distinguishable from the instant case because they 
involve cases where either the bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing 
or the debtors had received their discharge. In the instant case, 
the Creeches did not receive a discharge, failed to comply with 
the terms of their confirmed Plan, had their bankruptcy case 
dismissed as a result of their failure to comply with the 
confirmed Plan, and in the First District Court, repudiated the 
very bankruptcy proceedings upon which they now rely in their 
brief. 
Even if the cases relied upon by the Creeches were not 
distinguishable, however, the treatment of ipso facto clauses in 
those cases should not be the law in the State of Utah. The cases 
cited in First Security's brief together with the legislative 
history accompanying the text of 11 U.S.C. § 365 make it 
abundantly clear that ipso facto clauses in contracts were not 
intended to be invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law. The 
legislative history accompanying the text of § 365 states as 
follows: 
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This subsection does not limit the 
application of an ipso facto or bankruptcy 
clause if a new insolvency or receivership 
occurs after the bankruptcy case is closed. 
That is, the clause is not invalidated in toto, 
but merely made inapplicable during the case 
for the purposes of disposition of the 
executory contract or unexpired lease. 
Official Historical and Revision Notes, Senate Report No. 95-989, 
p. 112 (West 1991). 
In the instant case, when the Creeches filed bankruptcy, First 
Security was not in a position to enforce the ipso facto clauses. 
When the Creeches' bankruptcy was dismissed, the ipso facto clause 
became enforceable and an event of default under the terms of the 
1986 Loan Documents. 
II. THE CREECHES NON-PAYMENT DURING THE BANKRUPTCY CONSTITUTES 
AN ACT OF DEFAULT UNDER THE 1986 LOAN DOCUMENTS. 
In Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th 
Cir. 1989), a case cited by the Creeches in support of their 
position, the court, in effect, approved the issue of whether or 
not borrowers who had filed bankruptcy could be in default under 
the "insecurity" clause of a loan agreement. In that case, the 
court determined that since the borrowers were current on all of 
their payments, the creditor could not claim to be insecure simply 
because the borrowers had filed bankruptcy. The court said: 
We are in accord with the district and 
bankruptcy courts that the mere filing of the 
petition has not put Lowry [the creditor] in 
any more jeopardy than that which existed prior 
to the filing of the petition. Lowry did not 
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introduce any evidence of actual prejudice but 
merely relied upon speculative arguments over 
dreadful possibilities that may result if the 
debtors fail to exercise proper care of the 
truck or ultimately fail to pay. While 
evidence of actual prejudice might persuade us 
to the contrary, we can see no harm resulting 
to Lowry from the order of the bankruptcy court. 
Id. at 1546 (emphasis added). 
Unlike the borrowers in the Lowry case, the Creeches have not 
remained current on their loan payments during the bankruptcy and 
First Security has been forced to incur significant expense as a 
result of the bankruptcy and subsequent State Court proceedings. 
The Creeches also argue that the Bankruptcy Code "prevented" 
them from making payments to First Security and cite 11 U.S.C. 
§ 363 prohibiting the use of cash collateral during bankruptcy as 
authority. The Creeches admit in their brief that "[a]11 of the 
Creeches' cash was generated from the sale of milk in which First 
Security had a security interest." Brief of Orville and Ruby 
Creech, p. 17, fn. 3. In short, the Creeches make the incredible 
argument that they were prevented from making payments to First 
Security during the bankruptcy because First Security held a 
security interest in all of their cash collateral. The circuity 
of that argument is obvious. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code 
prevented the Creeches from making payments to First Security 
between November 28, 1986 when their bankruptcy was filed and 
June 11, 1987 when their Plan of Reorganization was confirmed. 
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III. FIRST SECURITY'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT REVIEW THE 
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT PREMATURE. 
The District Court's reservation of the issue of entitlement 
to attorney's fees does not "cure" the sua sponte ruling of the 
District Court declaring that perhaps the most important reason 
for First Security's entitlement to attorney's fees simply did not 
happen. 
While the trial court purported to reserve the issue of 
attorney's fees, it nevertheless effectively determined the 
primary issues which are the foundation for First Security's 
entitlement to attorney's fees. 
IV. UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 349, THE TRIAL COURT WAS OBLIGATED TO 
RESTORE BOTH PARTIES TO THE STATUS QUO THAT EXISTED PRIOR 
TO THE BANKRUPTCY. 
Section 349 of the bankruptcy code discusses the effects of a 
dismissal of a bankruptcy case. The purpose of § 349 is to 
restore all parties, as far as is practicable/ to the same 
position they were in at the commencement of the case, and to 
protect the rights of those who acted in reliance on the 
bankruptcy case. See In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 
1985) and In re Newton, 64 B.R. 790, 793 (Bankr. C D . 111. 1986). 
In its order, the trial court restored the Creeches to their 
pre-bankruptcy position, declaring that First Security could not 
use anything that occurred during the bankruptcy as an event of 
default. See Brief of Appellants, If 16. However, the court 
failed to provide the same relief for First Security. During the 
course of the bankruptcy First Security was forced to incur 
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significant attorney's fees in reliance upon the bankruptcy and in 
an attempt to protect its property rights. In order to restore 
First Security to its pre-bankruptcy position, the court should 
have awarded the amount of its costs and fees incurred during the 
bankruptcy. 
The Creeches argue that First Security's attorney's fees are 
not compensable because they are not a "property right" that 
existed prior to the bankruptcy. See Brief of Orville and Ruby 
Creech, p. 23. That argument, however, misses the point. If the 
court insists on restoring the Creeches to their pre-bankruptcy 
position, it must also do the same for First Security. Anything 
less than equal treatment for both parties would be inequitable. 
For that reason, First Security is entitled to compensation for 
the attorney's fees it was forced to incur during the Creeches' 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
V. FIRST SECURITY IS ENTITLED TO A RULING FROM THIS COURT TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE CREECH CHILDREN ARE IN DEFAULT 
UNDER THE 19 86 LOAN DOCUMENTS. 
The Creech children are co-debtors on the 1986 Loan 
Documents. See Brief of Appellant, If 1. The Creech children 
argue that since First Security's motion before the trial court 
did not claim that the Creech children were in default under the 
1986 Loan Documents, that First Security is now prohibited from 
raising that issue on appeal. See Brief of Larry, Joann and Herb 
Creech, p. 4. This argument, however, overlooks the peculiar 
procedural background of this issue. 
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First Security initially filed a motion before the trial court 
seeking to enforce the terms of the Stipulation and Order agreed 
upon with the Creeches in the bankruptcy. See Brief of 
Appellants, If 13. The Creech children were named as defendants in 
that action. 
At that time, the central issue before the court was whether 
the bankruptcy Stipulation and Order or the original 1986 Loan 
Documents controlled the relationship between the parties. In 
response, the trial court not only ruled that the 1986 Loan 
Documents were controlling, but it also unexpectedly ruled that 
the Creeches were not in default under the Loan Documents. See 
Brief of Appellants, 1f 16. 
None of the parties had addressed the issue of default under 
the 1986 Loan Documents. Nevertheless, the trial court, on its 
own initiative, ruled on that very issue. The mere fact that 
First Security did not formally "raise" the issue of the Creech 
children's default under the Loan Documents is therefore 
inconsequential. Whether or not it was raised, the trial court 
ruled on that issue, and First Security is entitled to ask this 
court for a review of that ruling on appeal. 
VI. FIRST SECURITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE 
CREECH CHILDREN ARE IN DEFAULT UNDER THE 1986 LOAN 
DOCUMENTS. 
The Creech children argue that First Security is estopped from 
claiming that the Creech children are in default under the 1986 
Loan Documents because of First Security's negotiation of the 
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Stipulation and Order with the Creeches during the bankruptcy. 
See Brief of Larry, Joann and Herb Creech, p. 5. The Creech 
children maintain that they relied on First Security's apparant 
willingness to accept reduced payments according to the terms of 
the Stipulation and Order, and that First Security is now estopped 
from claiming a default based upon those reduced payments. Id. 
First Security acknowledges that the Creeches were entitled to 
rely upon the terms of the Stipulation and Order in making reduced 
payments to First Security. Indeed, First Security does not claim 
that the making of reduced payments was a default of the Loan 
Documents. However, the Creech children conveniently ignore the 
fact that between the date of the bankruptcy and the date of the 
Stipulation and Order, a period of approximately eight months, 
neither the Creech parents nor the Creech children made any 
payments to First Security. See Brief of Appellants, If 3. It is 
this period of non-payment that constitutes a default under the 
terms of the 1986 Loan Documents. In addition, the Creeches have 
now repudiated the Stipulation and Order, and the trial court 
ruled that it was of no force and effect after the dismissal of 
the bankruptcy. For these reasons, First Security is not estopped 
from claiming that the Creech children are in default under the 
1986 Loan Documents. 
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VII. FIRST SECURITY'S STIPULATION AND ORDER WITH THE CREECHES 
DOES NOT RELEASE THE CREECH CHILDREN FROM THEIR OBLIGATION 
UNDER THE 1986 LOAN DOCUMENTS. 
The Creech children argue that First Security's negotiation 
and execution of the Stipulation and Order with the Creeches 
during the bankruptcy releases them from all liability under the 
1986 Loan Documents. See Brief of Larry# Joann and Herb Creech, 
p. 5. This argument is flawed for two reasons. 
First, although the Creech children were not formally named as 
parties to the Stipulation and Order, they were aware of the 
negotiations and they were present at the relevant hearings before 
the bankruptcy court. The Stipulation and Order was negotiated 
with the full knowledge and consent of the Creech children. In 
addition, the terms of the Stipulation and Order were also 
incorporated into the Creeches' plan of reorganization. See Brief 
of Appellant, Iflf 7-8. Thus, when the plan of reorganization was 
confirmed, the Creech children were bound by the terms of the 
Stipulation and Order since it was incorporated into the confirmed 
plan. 
More importantly, however, the Creech children are not 
released from their responsibilities under the 1986 Loan Documents 
because the Stipulation and Order has been ruled to be 
unenforceable. In the context of the Creeches' bankruptcy, the 
Stipulation and Order was an accord and satisfaction where First 
Security agreed to renegotiate the terms of the Loan Documents. 
Indeed, First Security argued that the trial court should enforce 
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the terms of the bankruptcy Stipulation and Order. See Brief of 
Appellant, If 13. The Creeches, however, argued that the 
Stipulation and Order negotiated in the context of the bankruptcy 
was of no force or effect once the bankruptcy case had been 
dismissed. See id. at % 12. The trial court ruled that the 
bankruptcy Stipulation and Order was not enforceable outside of 
bankruptcy. See id. at M 16. As a matter of law, if an accord 
and satisfaction is determined to be invalid, the original 
Documents between the parties remains valid and enforceable. See 
Golden Kev Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1986) 
and Restatement 2d of Contracts § 281 (1981). 
Indeed the trial court, recognizing this principal, ruled that 
since the bankruptcy Stipulation and Order was unenforceable, the 
1986 Loan Documents remained in full force and effect. That 
portion of the trial court's ruling has not been appealed. For 
all of these reasons, the Creech children have not been released 
from their obligation under the 1986 Loan Documents, and First 
Security is entitled to maintain this action to enforce those 
obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Creeches' filing of bankruptcy and their subsequent 
non-payment during the bankruptcy constitute events of default 
under the terms of the 1986 Loan Documents. Upon the dismissal of 
the Creeches1 bankruptcy case, First Security was entitled to 
enforce its rights under the Loan Documents against all 
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defendants. The District Court's ruling to the contrary was in 
error. The Distict Court also erred in denying First Security's 
claim for reimbursement for attorney's fees incurred during the 
bankruptcy. 
First Security seeks a reversal of the decision of the 
District Court respecting the effects of the bankruptcy of 
defendants Orville and Ruby Creech and nonpayment by all 
defendants of their obligations under the 1986 Loan Documents. 
The case should be remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to modify its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment as follows: 
1. Ruling that defendants are in default under the 1986 Loan 
Documents by reason of the bankruptcy and nonpayment of their 
obligations under the terms of those documents during and after 
the bankruptcy proceedings. 
2. Determining that/ as a result of said defaults, First 
Security has incurred expenses, including attorneys' fees. 
3. Determining that First Security is entitled to recover 
said expenses from defendants, including a reasonable attorneys' 
fee in an amount to be determined by the District Court. 
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